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THE BBC PERSIAN SERVICE 1941–1979
Annabelle Sreberny and Massoumeh Torfeh
The BBC World Service (BBCWS) functions with a deep and intriguing tension
at the heart of its activities. Funded directly by the FCO, the BBCWS is subject to
the changing priorities and concerns of British foreign policy. However, by 2008, the
services themselves have come to operate under the sign of impartiality and distance
from direct government influence.
The BBCWS practice of distance from government has emerged over time and
not without a struggle to claim and preserve control over the content of its
broadcasts. Here we examine a particularly rich vein of BBCWS history, the
establishment and development of the Persian language service. This was developed in
the epoch of the Empire Service, a time of overt utilization of external radio services
as tools of propaganda, and has played a major role in relations between the UK
and the Persian-speaking world in crucial political conjunctures. Iranians have both
listened to the BBC with scepticism but also regarded the Persian Service as one of
their most trusted sources of news and information. The recent 2007 FCO allocation
of funds to the development of Arabic television and Persian television reveals how
central the Middle East region—and Iran in particular—remains to British political
and economic interests.
The paper describes how the BBC Persian Service became involved in three key
moments in British–Persian relations and the attempts at political pressure from
its own government with which it had to cope. These moments are the removal of
Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1941, the UK–Iran oil negotiations during 1948–1953 and the
period leading up to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The analysis of the latter period
will be embellished as and when government documents are released under the
30 Year rule. The paper also shows how the relationship between the BBCWS and
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the British government was perceived by Iranians and explores attempts by Iranian
politicians themselves to influence the BBC. Three primary sources of material have
been used, including recent original interviews with many Iranians who have worked
with the Persian Service, the archives of BBC Persian Service broadcasts and historical
documents in the Public Records Office. This is a preliminary investigation of one
particular service, which can contribute to understanding the broader implications
of the government–external broadcasting nexus. Further research might compare this
particular experience with other language services to determine its specificity and
to understand better the range of mechanisms through which influence is brought
to bear.
The Empire Service first broadcast on shortwave radio in 1932, its aim being to
develop international communications to Britain’s overseas territories. In the run-up
to the Second World War, the Foreign Office began funding BBC language services
to counter the growing international propaganda of the Axis powers.
The BBC entered the Second World War unsure of its role. Britain was in a state
of total war with every resource focused on winning the battle against the Axis
powers. The BBC Archive timeline recounts the story of the first days thus:
Managers at the fledgling corporation debated whether the BBC should report
the conflict objectively—or contribute to the war effort by broadcasting morale
boosting propaganda. By the autumn of 1940, Britain was suffering almost nightly
bombardment from German planes. On 15 October a delayed action bomb hit
Broadcasting House in London. It landed in the music library at 2010 GMT and
exploded 52 minutes later, killing seven people. Listeners to the nine o’clock
news heard the announcer pause, and then continue reading.1
The BBC reinvented itself during the Second World War, more than doubling in size
and adopting a new culture and outlook. In the summer of 1943, the BBC’s two War
Reporting Units were set up, comprising teams of seven that contained a mix of
reporters, producers and engineers. The title of ‘war correspondent’ was established
for Richard Dimbleby who covered the Second World War in Europe, Africa and the
Middle East. In the years that followed, war reporting became a specialist skill that
required new technical equipment and training which was different in nature to the
daily news reporting. Reporting needed to take into consideration wartime security
and intelligence requirements without being propaganda.
The biggest expansion came early in 1940–1941, ahead of American involvement
in the war, when the outlook for Britain was bleakest. The Government asked the
BBC to increase its overseas effort threefold. A special service for North America
was introduced, offering entertainment as well as news of the British struggle. There
were services in every major European language, from Scandinavia to the Balkans,
plus services were introduced for the Soviet Union, Persia, India, Japan and
more. The war proved to be a tough test of the BBC’s independence. At times,
the Government and the military wanted to use the BBC to counter crude
propaganda from the Nazis and there was even talk in Westminster of taking over
the BBC.
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The Persian Service and Reza Shah
The government rationale behind the development of the Persian Service was the
suspicion that the Iranian king, Reza Shah Pahlavi, was increasingly sympathetic
to Nazi Germany. Reza Shah had come to power in 1923 with the support of the
British Government. However, declaring Iran neutral, he declined any cooperation
in wartime. The British government was most concerned that he might adopt
a pro-Hitler position and potentially block the Allied efforts in the East. It was
becoming clear that many Iranians were listening to Berlin Radio and that the British
war propaganda was not working very effectively.
Already, in December 1939, Sir Reader Bullard, head of the British Legation
in Teheran, had suggested that the Iranians would not be entirely opposed to the idea
that the BBC might broadcast some programmes in Persian. The Foreign Office
responded in February 1940 with a positive note from Lacey Baggallay of the Eastern
Department suggesting that the idea was being seriously considered:
You will remember saying in your telegram of 29 December that the Persian
Government no longer deprecated the commencement of broadcast in Persian
from London . . . We therefore can ascertain what provisions BBC had made for
this eventuality . . . I understand that Persian has now been moved high up on the
list of languages waiting attention and the Treasury will begin financial
assistance to BBC in this matter.2
By the spring of 1940, the Foreign Office is asking the Legation in Teheran to find an
Iranian translator and suggest ‘an approximate salary likely to be accepted. Hours of
work will be short.’3 A number of academics were involved in the planning of the
service, while many who worked for the service later became academics. Professor
Rushbrook Williams was consulted by the Foreign Office on the best arrangements for
starting Persian broadcasts and in June 1940, the Foreign Office suggested sending
a professional journalist to work alongside the Press Attache´ in Teheran, a Miss Anne
Lambton, who of course went on to become on of Britain’s most notable experts
on Iran.4
By early 1941, Bullard was urging the Foreign Office to act, reminding them that,
‘The success of German Propaganda in Iran and the failure of the British propaganda
to make any headway against it have been indicated frequently by the Press Attache´
in her reports.’5
Issues of language/translation clearly had to be solved and finding appropriate
people was not easy. Finally, in August, Stevenson, the director of the Eastern Service
informed the Foreign Office that a Mr Gladdening would take charge of the proposed
BBC newscasts in Persian, that a number of Iranian students had already been
recruited for translation and that Mr Hamzavi of the Iranian Legation was considered
an ‘ideal man’ to take charge of the actual broadcasts.6 Thus the initial period of
development shows very close communication between the BBC, the Foreign Office
and the legation in Teheran. It is also interesting to note that the Ministry of
Information would be ‘contributing’ to Mr Hamzavi’s salary, which meant that he
would leave the Legation.7
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Additionally, in August 1940, the Foreign Office Eastern Department had drawn
up a paper entitled ‘BBC Broadcasts in Persian’ which had set out some basic
operating procedures for ‘the guidance of the BBC in the preparation of material for
the projected news broadcasts in the Persian language’. The FOED was at pains to
note that these guidelines are strictly ‘intended for the use of the regular British
officials only and they should not be shown or communicated to any Persian-speaking
official’8 and suggested that
It is to be hoped that these new broadcasts will be devoted to the straight news
of the world and that, while it is understood that the Ministry of Information will
supply news telegrams containing items of more local interest, the broadcasts
should as far as possible avoid going into Middle Eastern political questions . . . if
some particular event requires clarifying or explanation, the Foreign Office
will always be willing to advise on the commentary which the BBC would wish
to add.9
It further suggests that Reza Shah should be treated with due sensitivity and diplomacy
in these broadcasts because:
The Shah is not a popular figure but he is still in complete control and is likely to
retain power. While gross flattery of his person or his rule should be avoided,
he should be presented as an energetic modern-minded ruler, under whose rule
Iran has made great economic and cultural progress. Iran’s relations with His
Majesty’s Government are excellent. Emphasis might on suitable conditions be
laid on the long-standing traditional friendship between the two countries . . . and
care should be taken not to suggest that HM Government has any influence
whatsoever on Iranian policy.10
Thus, while ‘straight’ news is recommended, the propaganda ‘spin’ is also quite
clearly spelled out, including the appearance of BBC neutrality and a stress on the lack
of British involvement in domestic Persian politics, a message of vital importance to
get across to Iranian listeners. In the first broadcast on 29 December 1940, Hassan
Movaghar-Balyuzi, the new young presenter recruited from Iran, followed that line
and introduced the BBC broadcasts as the dawning of a new era, claiming that ‘the
BBC Persian Service is aiding a new relationship between the two nations of Britain
and Iran’.11 Abulghassem Taheri, also just recruited from Tehran, suggested that the
British Press welcomed the opening of the Persian Service as a step towards better
relations with Iran.12 The short 15-minute news bulletins broadcast four nights a week
over the first few months maintained this position.
However, the rhetoric of mutual friendship did not last very long. Britain was
becoming increasingly impatient with Reza Shah over his lack of cooperation over the
deportation of some 3000 Germans believed to be resident in Iran. Reza Shah refused,
arguing that the Germans were mainly engineers employed in his modernization
programme while British Intelligence had documents revealing that German spies such
as Franz Mayer were working in Iran.13
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As the conduct of the war became more intense, so too did matters with the BBC.
On 7 August 1941, Sir Reader Bullard in Teheran wrote in a ‘Most Secret’ memo
entitled ‘Propaganda in Persia’:
The question of propaganda against the Shah would be completely altered in the
case of a Russian/British ultimatum, which would be followed by military action
in a few days in the case of non-compliance. To forestall the Germans and make
the prospect of occupation more palatable we might, simultaneously with the
ultimatum, release articles and wireless talks about Iran (Persia), referring not
only to the good points, but also to the great defects of the present regime,
e.g. compulsory acquisition of land at dishonestly low prices, and the enormous
cost of living. By then it should be too late for the Shah to throw himself
to the arms of the Germans, while the army—which is anti-Shah—would be
encouraged to turn against him rather than obey him.14
On August 22, Bullard sent yet another memo, ‘BBC Broadcasts in Persian’ to the
Foreign Office, suggesting what the revised propaganda line should be:
Tribute could be paid to the Shah as a soldier in the early days but it should be hinted
that greediness and tyranny have made him a different man. Forcible acquisition
of land, forced labor, general poverty and corruption, acute shortage of water,
Shah’s own wealth and ownership of factories . . . his monopoly of all prices . . . his
involvement with opium trade . . . his bad treatment of soldiers . . . weakness of the
political structure . . . Constitution only in name, a powerless parliament, dictated
elections . . . could all be highlighted. Also it could be stressed that England has
a democratic Government whereas the Shah, like Hitler, thinks the people are like
sheep and are only fit to carry orders blindly.15
After the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, the British found it impossible to work with
Reza Shah,, Anthony Eden explaining to the Teheran legation that the Government
had no wish to interfere unnecessarily in Persian internal affairs but that it was ‘clearly
difficult for them to operate fully with an administration that had long ceased to
represent the wishes of the people.’16 Now the BBC Persian Service was tasked with
broadcasting more items that revealed Reza Shah’s autocratic style of leadership and
that encouraged the formation of a republican system of Government:
His Majesty’s Government now agreed that the BBC might begin to give various
broadcasts in Persian which had been prepared beforehand, starting with talks
on Constitutional Government and increasing in strength and colour until
all Reza Shah’s mismanagement, greed and cruelty were displayed to the public
gaze . . .
Abrahamian cites analysis by Sir Reader Bullard’s Annual Report about the political
situation in Iran which suggests that, encouraged by the lead given by the BBC, the
deputies in the Majlis, who had been subservient to the Shah for many years, passed a
T H E B B C P E R S I A N S E R V I C E 1 9 4 1 – 1 9 7 9 519
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Sr
eb
er
ny
, 
An
na
be
ll
e]
 A
t:
 1
6:
39
 2
0 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
08
resolution asking for reform; a deputation of them waited upon the Shah and ask him
to abdicate, and within three weeks the Shah had gone.17 Bullard later wrote that
on numerous occasions the Allies were unable to get even their most essential
military requirements without the application of the strongest diplomatic pressure
and once or twice the virtual threat of force. We were obliged to interfere
regularly and radically in the local administration . . . There were times when we
used to wonder whether in the end we might not have to take over the country
and run it ourselves.18
The shift in tone of the BBC broadcasts may have helped to produce the desired effect.
Shahrokh Golestan, now a well-known film director, interviewed by the Persian
Service for the 65th anniversary of Persian broadcasts, vividly remembered listening
to the BBC broadcasts:
. . . every evening we used to get together with our neighbors to listen to the BBC
Persian broadcasts. We all used to sit in a circle in the garden and the radio—
which used to be kept on the second floor—would be turned towards the garden
so we could all hear it. We listened every night, not just to the BBC, but also to
Radio Berlin to make sure we didn’t miss anything.19
The news bulletins were in fact written by the War Unit of the BBC, translated in to
Persian and then broadcast by the new Iranian recruits. It was direct war reporting
in the propaganda style of the day. The pressure by the Government on the BBCWS
broadcasts is reflected in an internal BBC account of wartime reporting:
From the start, there was tension with the government as to how much freedom
should be allowed in wartime to the BBC radio news operations and it took time
to establish an effective method of working between the BBC and the new
Ministry of Information. BBC staff were seconded to the Ministry—and so-called
‘vigilantes’ from the Ministry were on permanent duty in the newsroom, often
alongside representatives of the services.20
Apart from Movaghar-Balyuzi, the first recruits to the BBC Persian Service included
Mojtaba Minovi, who had come to Britain on a study tour, but had stayed on for the
fear of persecution in Reza Shah’s regime. Minovi later taught Persian at Oxford,
became a distinguished scholar of Persian literature and gained a reputation as
a serious Iranian intellectual. Then Massoud Farzaad and Paul Elwell-Sutton, who had
worked for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, were also recruited to strengthen the
broadcasts and ensure accuracy of translation.21 Abbas Dehghan, another of the first
generation of Persian Service reporters describes the way the service functioned,
with British personnel monitoring the orientation of output carefully. He recalls that
‘we read exactly whatever we were given to read. We were not allowed to make any
changes. There were a couple of English people who were monitoring what we
broadcast. They spoke Persian and they listened carefully.’22
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Reza Shah viewed the Persian Service with strong suspicion. An influential
politician of the era, Nassrollah Fatemi, has recalled that the BBC gave nightly reports
of Reza Shah’s cruelties, leading Reza Shah himself to tell his acting Foreign Minister,
Ameri, that he should listen to the BBC in order to understand British opinion of his
monarchy and how the British were making decisions about his future. Fatemi
recounts that Reza Shah told Ameri ‘the BBC is saying I will be gone soon,’ and the
same evening the BBC reported that ‘Reza Khan was brought by us but has now
become too arrogant. He has now turned into a dictator who is confiscating public
property.’23
By 1944, the British Government had decided on new, more indirect ways of
using the BBC Persian broadcasts. The FCO recognized that
these broadcasts carry more weight than statements made in our local broadcasts
in Persian and are listened to by a wider audience. This approach would be more
effective than supplying the Persian press with material especially prepared for
Persian consumption which by the very nature of its presentation is likely to be
treated with suspicion.24
In February 1944, the legation in Teheran was promoted to embassy status and Bullard
became Ambassador. By April, he had already planned a wider propaganda campaign
by extending the activities of the British Council:
Cultural propaganda is a field in which we have much leeway to make up in
Persia. Persian culture connections have been mainly French . . . Under the late
Shah the activity of the British Council was very restricted . . . politically the
extension of the British Council should be valuable because they give us contact
with the younger generation and an opportunity to influence them in the pro-
British direction.25
In June, he further detailed the nature of the new, more indirect way of influencing
politics in Iran:
When action is taken by a Persian official as a result of persuasion or pressure by
a consular officer, the British delegations should, as far as possible, be kept
directly in the background and subordinate officials and the public should be
allowed and even encouraged to believe that the Persian official acted on his own
responsibility and initiative.26
Thus, it was the Second World War that triggered the establishment of the BBC
Persian Service under heavy FCO direction. While some of those involved in the
Persian Service wish to arrogate a strong role for the broadcasts in the downfall of
Reza Shah, this is neither endorsed nor challenged here, where our focus is simply on
the changing role of BBCWS Persian and its relationship with the British government
and not an assessment of its effectiveness. Yet evidence suggests both that Reza Shah
himself was listening and considered the Persian Service to be the voice of the British
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government and that the direction of popular change moved in ways that the British
wanted and had directed the Persian Service to endorse.
The Persian Service and oil nationalization
After the war, a softer, more indirect mode of control was gradually established
and the BBC alongside the British Council became located within an emerging
framework of ‘cultural propaganda’ that was later to be reconfigured as ‘public
diplomacy’.
After emerging as the leading global broadcaster during the war, the BBCWS
was incorporated into the BBC’s Royal Charter in 1946.27 From the start, there was
an attempt to safeguard the Service’s editorial independence from government,
since this was seen by the broadcaster as the cornerstone of the service’s credibility
and therefore of its impact. The 1946 Broadcasting White Paper, developed by the
coalition government yet proposed finally by Attlee’s Labour government, set out
the relationship between government and the BBC, which still pertains today.
It reads:
The Government intends that the Corporation should remain independent in the
preparation of programs for overseas audiences, although it should obtain from
the government departments concerned such information about conditions in
those countries and the policy of His Majesty’s government towards them as will
permit it to plan its programs in the national interest.28
However, the wording does not set out a clear dividing line about what the BBC can
and not say, nor how the various language channels both remain independent yet also
programme in ‘the national interest’.
In Iran after the war, a period of reform and democratization ensued. Reza Shah
was removed and the parliament became a more major centre of decision-making.
Political parties were formed, each with their dedicated fractions inside the parliament
and with their own preferences as to which foreign power—the British, Russian or
growing American presence—might best serve the needs of Iran. Although the British
had their group of parliamentary supporters, they fell rapidly out of favour with the
majority of reformists lead by Mossadeq because of the growing confrontation over
the nationalization of Iranian oil.
Throughout the 1940s, the British Government had problems persuading the
Iranian Government to continue with its exceptional concessions on oil extraction
with the Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The British pointed to Article 21 of the
1933 agreement signed with the AIOC, which stated that the concession could not be
altered or annulled by the Persian Government. The reformist movement and
the National Front Party of Dr Mossadeq, Prime Minister of Iran from 1951, thought
otherwise, often referring to a clause in the same agreement that spoke about
activities being in the ‘national interest of Iran’. An example of the anger and
disaffection with the British can be found in a lead article in the National Front
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newspaper, Keshvar, that directly addressed the British Prime Minister just before the
vote on the nationalization of oil:
How can Mr. Attlee have the right of nationalizing British heavy industries and
we cannot have the right to nationalize our oil industry? Mr. Furlong [the British
Foreign Office representative visiting Iran at the time] must tell the high
authorities including Mr. Eden that Persians are no longer prepared to come to
any compromise with the Anglo Iranian Oil Company. In fact the company is now
detested by the Persian people.29
A revealing document shows the way the BBC was brought in to help. On 1 March
1951, Furlong wrote to Mr Serpel at the Treasury and Mr Butler at the Ministry of
Fuel and Power suggesting a BBC talk on the subject of oil:
Sir Francis Shepherd [of the UK embassy in Teheran] has suggested, and we agree,
that it would be useful to inspire the BBC’s Persian Service at this present stage
in the oil question . . . I enclose a draft memorandum bringing out the points
we feel can usefully be made in this context. They are cast in such a way that
nationalization is not, and cannot be, a purely internal Persian problem. They are
also designed to show the impracticality of nationalization and the financial and
other losses which any such move may involve.30
The memorandum suggests that seven lines of argument be proposed, including
a focus on financial losses, the harm to Iranian reputation internationally and the
adverse effects on the industry as a whole. Three days later, on 4 March and just a day
before the vote in the Majles, all these points were articulated in a BBC Persian
Service broadcast. The talk argued that
In the first place it must be remembered that the Anglo-Iranian oil company has
invested vast sums of money . . . the arbitrary cancellation of the oil agreement
and the failure to honor an international agreement would seriously damage
Persian credit and reputation in the world . . . it would be difficult to see how
Persia thinks of paying a huge sum to which an international tribunal would
certainly consider the company entitled . . . and there is the company’s
expenditure of tens of millions of pounds . . . 31
The British Government tried to forestall further action by Mossadeq by asking the
International Court of Justice in The Hague for an interim injunction calling upon
the Persian Government not to prejudice the position of the AIOC. The British
Embassy in Teheran, concerned about the possible failure of negotiations, developed
an appropriate ‘line for News Department and the BBC’. Its points, written out in full
detail, were given to the BBC following a briefing at the Foreign Office on 19 March
1953, and included the following lines:
1. Minimum comment
2. Stress that Mossadeq has rejected a fair and equitable settlement
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3. Proposal was Anglo–US
4. Joint work was requested by Mossadeq
5. Mossadeq’s speech offered inaccurate information on compensation figure and
revenues
6. No question of undue burden on the economy of Persia
7. No comment on counter proposals
8. Avoid issuing the text of Compensation Agreement.32
Of course, these were exceptional circumstances, with the British government set
to lose face internationally, undertake an ignominious retreat from southern Iran and
having to cope with the consequent loss of revenue. However, they do indicate clearly
that at times of foreign policy tension, the BBC Persian Service has been called upon
in very direct ways to broadcast in support of governmental objectives and that the
content of broadcasts has been dictated from without.
This period of broadcasting also left many Iranians with the impression that the
BBC was working in close cooperation with the British Government. Abulhassan Bani
Sadr, at the time a close advisor to Mossadeq, has claimed quite simply, in a BBC
interview broadcast for the 65th anniversary of the Service, that the ‘BBC was the
voice of British imperialism and we did not trust it.’33 Shahrokh Golestan, interviewed
for the same programme, said that BBC broadcasts contained frequent attacks on
Mossadeq’s Government, adding ‘I remember that their reports always ended by this
sentence: ‘‘the adverse effects will most probably be for Iran.’’’34
Elwell-Sutton, in his book Persian Oil, mentions the role of BBC broadcasts in
persuading Iranians not to support oil nationalization:
From London where the BBC had doubled and trebled its transmissions in the
Persian language, Persians were told that the British staff [of AIOC] would leave
if the company was not given its way. And if this happened the oil industry
would collapse. And if the oil industry collapsed, listeners were warned, Persia’s
economic system would collapse too.35
He adds that Teheran radio also resorted to propaganda material attacking the British
Ambassador daily. Norman Kemp, who called himself ‘a regular Abadan reporter,’
wrote in his book Abadan that suddenly there was a surge of journalists going to Iran:
Colin Reid, Walter Farr and Peter Webb, British United Press reporter, White
and myself as regulars from the Abadan corps; soon to be reinforced with Douglas
Willis, of the BBC. Alan Clarke of London’s Daily Herald, John Fisher of Kemsley
Group, Bob Long, Associated Press of America, Flora Lewis of London’s
Observer and her husband Sydney Gruson of the New York Times, Homer
Bigart, Politzer-winner of the New York Herald-Tribune, Jacques Marcus of the
AFP, and newsreel cameraman Robert Hecox were among correspondents who
sailed to Abadan during weeks of lax political tension in the capital.36
This sudden surge of adverse reporting on Mossadeq had its effect on the BBC Persian
Service broadcasters. Some personnel simply went awol. Anvar, a Persian broadcaster,
recalls that ‘when it came to reporting adversely on Mossadeq suddenly for two weeks
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all Iranian broadcasters disappeared. The BBC had no choice but to bring in English
people who spoke Persian, because the Iranians had gone on strike. The broadcasts
were all in a Persian with a strong English accent.’37 Another veteran broadcaster,
Dehghan, has noted that broadcasts were mainly translations of British analysis and
even the satire and cultural programmes were written by the British and translated
by the Persian broadcasters. But the situation was different when it came to Mossadeq,
since ‘no Iranian was prepared to say anything against Mossadeq. Nobody would be
disrespectful of Mossadeq.’38
Elwell-Sutton was sympathetic to the strike action, writing that
this radio propaganda was . . . offensive . . . No wonder the BBC’s Persian
announcers on several occasions patriotically refused to speak the lines handed
to them! British propaganda services, on instructions from the Eastern
Department of the Foreign Office, attempted to whitewash Britain’s record in
Persia by plugging the work of British scholars in the Persian language . . . 39
Kemp’s account of this crisis period shows how tension between the UK and Iran
was seeping down to journalists and he describes in detail the technical difficulties of
getting news out of Abadan. He wrote
There was a pattern for news coverage in Abadan. First a conference with [Eric]
Drake, [Oil Board] between nine and ten o’clock in the morning; then we wrote
the stories in a small [AIOC] Company office adjoining the administrative block.
A Persian staff clerk hired for us a taxi . . . which was sent to the frontier . . . local
fishermen paddled the copy across the Shatt-el-Arab river at the border . . . then
another taxi arranged buy AIOC carried it to . . . and then to Basra telegraph
office. Once we had sent the reports we met the Oil Board . . . and for greater
depths to news reporters interviewed privately the British Government and
company officials and the Persian cabinet.40
It is clear from this account that the bulk of information for Western media was
provided by the AIOC, the British Government and embassy officials while the Persian
press was mainly fed by Iranians officials, thereby causing some split in reporting
and the resulting mutual distrust. At such a crisis point, it was difficult for the Persian
Service to maintain both points of view and some of the Persian staff opted to strike.
And yet Kemp speaks about the important role that the BBC played in giving
information to Iranians.
The Persian authorities had suspended the Company’s [AIOC] daily newspaper,
and each afternoon and evening the oilmen huddled around radio sets to listen
to BBC overseas broadcasts for up-to-date information. If Abadan or Teheran
were not mentioned in the bulletins the staff was despondent, believing the
omission was an augury of defeat.41
Nevertheless, the pro-nationalization majority did not always trust the Persian
Service’s broadcasts. At the height of the crisis, when the US Government begins to
mediate between Iran and UK, Hussein Makki, the trusted right hand man of
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Mossadeq, attacked the British conduct and specifically mentioned the BBC. In
August 1951, when as a member of the Oil Board he accompanied the US President’s
representative, Averell Harriman, to see the squalid conditions of the living
quarters of the Persian oil workers in Abadan, Makki referred with suspicion to
the BBC:
Should the Mossadeq Government suffer defeat, Soviet propaganda will convince
the people that only with Russian aid can the Iranians succeed. It is in this that the
greatest danger lays. The desire of the British capitalist is that nationalization
should fail. They are shareholders in the AIOC and they are trying in every
possible way and through underhand methods to bring down the Mossadeq
Government. This is being done with the aid of the Persian-language broadcasts
and the commentaries of the BBC, by inspired and biased articles in the British
press . . . 42
In June 1951, while Mossadeq’s Government was preparing to take control of Iran’s
oil industry and Britain was once again deploying military force in the Persian Gulf,
the Foreign Office gave extra funding for an half hour additional broadcast to Iran,
although the embassy in Teheran had only asked for an extra 15 minutes. The evening
broadcasts was lengthened and an additional 15 minutes afternoon broadcast added,
although the latter was dropped after 27 August 1951 when Britain gave up its plans
for the military invasion of Iran.
Despite relying on the factual information it provided, many Iranians considered
the BBC to be the voice of the British government and as such considered it to be
highly biased against Mossadeq. Some decades later, in February 2001, a report
prepared by the BBC for the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
acknowledged that Iranians did not trust the BBC at either of the two conjunctures
discussed so far:
The BBC Persian Service’s broadcasts to Iran started on 28 December 1940 to
counter the influence of German Radio in Persian from Berlin. The BBC’s initial
output was a modest hour per week centered on war news. In 1941, the allies
entered Iran and removed from power the then pro-German nationalist Shah,
Reza Pahlavi, replacing him with his young son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
The BBC’s reports on the Shah’s cruelty and corruption were seen as a prelude to
his departure. From the very outset, therefore, many in Iran regarded the BBC
as an instrument of British imperial involvement. This was particularly true in the
case of the young Shah himself. When Britain and the US supported the Shah’s
coup against the democratically elected Prime Minister, Dr Mossadeq, in August
1953, many nationalists criticized the BBC’s broadcasts for playing a key pro-Shah
and anti-Mossadeq role.43
Of course, oil was nationalized and the British packed their bags and left. Yet
subsequently the democratic nationalist movement of Mossadeq was squashed and
in 1953, a coup engineered by the British and the Americans returned the son of
Reza Shah to the throne.
526 H I S T O R I C A L J O U R N A L O F F I L M , R A D I O A N D T E L E V I S I O N
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Sr
eb
er
ny
, 
An
na
be
ll
e]
 A
t:
 1
6:
39
 2
0 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
08
Perceived prosperity and Pahlavi pressures: the period before the Revolution
After 1953, US military investment in Iran enabled the Shah of Iran to re-establish his
power and in 1963 he embarked on his ‘White Revolution’. However, excessive
reliance on foreign borrowing to feed the Seven Year Plan for economic development
and escalating military expenditure caused a financial crisis, forcing Iran to borrow
heavily from the IMF, which in turn asked for reforms that included trimming the
budget, freezing wage rises and shelving some development projects. This became
another cause for tension and opposition, this time led mainly by a powerful clergy
but also involving National Front members. In June 1963, there were massive
demonstrations during the holy month of Ramadan led mainly by Ayatollah Khomeini.
Thousands of shopkeepers, clergymen, teachers, bazaar merchants and students came
out to denounce the Shah. The demonstrations lasted for three days but left hundreds
dead. The military kept its loyalty to the Shah and he weathered the storm. The Shah
ordered the arrest of National Front members and deported Khomeini to Turkey from
where he went on to Najaf in Iraq.
Through to the late 1970s, the Shah was regarded internationally as an unrivalled
and ambitious dictator, a devoted ally of the US and as enjoying excellent relations
with the international community. Iran was portrayed in the western press as enjoying
prosperity and economic growth and the Shah staged the extravagant celebrations
of the 2500 anniversary of monarchy at Persepolis in 1971. But movements against the
Shah were growing inside Iran and amongst Iranians abroad. These included leftist
and underground movements as well as the clergy and the remnants of Mossadeq’s
National Front. The International Confederation of Iranian Students organized
across Europe and the Shah’s visits to Europe were often an opportunity for the
Confederation to demonstrate its growing power.
Lutfali Khonji, a veteran Persian Service broadcaster who joined the BBC in 1968,
said in a recent interview that during this period full details of these demonstrations
were given in BBC broadcasts and there were no restrictions on reporting anti-Shah
slogans despite the amicable relations between the UK and the Shah. He never had any
personal experience of being told what to say or which line to take although he was
one of the main news editors, then known as a ‘programme assistant’. However, he
noted that the programme assistants did not writing the original reports, news or
analysis. Rather news items were prepared in the central newsroom of the BBC and
the analysis was written by British reporters so that programme assistants only had the
task of translating from English to Persian and broadcasting. Khonji said that if there
was any pressure to be born, it may have been on newsroom editors or the so-called
‘talks writers’ but that in his experience ‘the BBC would never impose any line on any
of its staff.’44 However, he did believe that individual managers, reporters or analysts
might be persuaded to toe a particular line. For him, persuasion on individuals rather
than force on the system as a whole was the only possible way of influencing the news
and analysis in the BBC.
He says that at times of crisis, the budget of the Service would go up and
programme durations would be increased. In response to a question about the relative
lack of importance of the BBC during the mid-1960s to late 1970s—when the Shah
was most powerful—Khonji responded
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that’s because there was nothing important to report in Iran during the 1960s.
Whatever there was to report, was reported—such as the huge demonstrations
against the Shah in Germany in the late 1960s or the case of someone standing up
in the UN General Assembly in mid-1970s calling the Shah a murderer. There was
little opposition and thus little newsworthy to report during the years after the
US-led coup of 1953 through to early 1970s.45
The only unusual practice, according to Khonji was that the Persian broadcasts would
always play the Iranian national anthem when it was the Shah’s birthday: ‘this is very
unusual for the BBC WS and begs the question of whether this was to appease the Shah?’46
Another veteran broadcaster, Majid Massoudi, suggested that during this period
the Shah used to listen to Persian Service broadcasts and frequently tried put pressure
on the BBC:
The Iranian intelligence ministry and other related organizations always listened
to our program with diligence. Whenever we said something tiny that they
considered anti Iranian they used to complain. We were always under pressure of
such criticism.47
He also said that inside the Service there were discussions about how to refer to the
Shah, with some Iranians preferring to use Shahanshah [King of kings], others Alihazrat
[His Highness] and others who preferred simply Shah.
Khonji confirmed the constant pressure put on the BBC by the Shah: ‘In Germany
in 1968 for 3–4 days there were a lot of anti-Shah demonstrations culminating in a huge
demonstration in Berlin. We reported all these and the Shah did not like this at all.’48
Massoudi says the BBC Persian Service used to report different sides of the Iran
story. He alluded to the fact that in 1967 when the BBC Persian service was allowed
by the Shah for the first time to send an Iranian reporter, Fazlullah Nikaiin, to report
on the celebrations for his coronation, much of his broadcast was a positive appraisal
of the Shah:
I daresay Iranians have never taken part in such a united mass celebrations. Other
than the pageantry, these celebrations are for showing gratitude to the crowned
leader of Iran, Shahahnshah, in one of the most stable, most important, and most
decisive moments of Iran’s history.49
But when a BBC English reporter, John Birdman, went to Iran and portrayed poverty
close to the pageantry, the Shah ordered his deportation.
The Persian Service and the Islamic Revolution of 1979
The BBC Persian Service rose to unprecedented prominence inside Iran in the years
leading to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Recalling the lead up to the Revolution of
1979, Khonji says:
At this stage there was a lot to report since the opposition was gathering
momentum and they were contacting us in the BBC with news. It was not just the
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Islamic activists but also the National Front and left activists of a variety of
colours. They would call us daily giving us details of demonstrations, gatherings
and their political statements. So we had a lot to report.50
By this time several new staff was recruited including Baqer Moin who later in 1992
became the first Iranian head of the Service. Shadab Vajdi, Sharan Tabari, Solmaz
Dabiri, Fereydoon Jahed and Shahryar Radpoor were other important programme
assistants.
A common assertion made by pro-monarchist Iranians was that the BBC would
tend to be ahead of the news in Iran, announcing demonstrations before they
happened. Khonji response to this idea by saying
those working in the BBC had their own set of contacts. Baqer Moin had close
contacts with the Islamic scholars and activists and I was the main link for the
National Front and as such my friends would pass on the relevant news on
developments. Improved communications techniques meant that the BBC could
be heard far better in Europe and through the BBC broadcasts the Iranian diaspora
were increasingly involved in the struggle for democracy in Iran. Another element
that increased news coverage was that the BBC dispatched several reporters to
Iran and thus could report from various corners of the country on developments.
That meant the volume of incoming news was suddenly drastically increased.
New methods of broadcasting such as interviews were allowed. Despite this there
were only a few major interviews and the senior British managers did not feel too
happy about these since they could not follow the contents. In the one year
leading to the revolution, there was only one interview with Khomeini, three or
four with Shapur Bakhtiar and two with Abdulkarim Sanjabi, who led the National
Front activists.51
But Khonji also recalls the great difficulties, both technical and political, in trying to
interview Ayatollah Khomeini that suggest a less sanguine view of BBCWS pressure:
At the time interviewing was done with great technical difficulty. We had to book
studios and lines. I also had to speak to several contacts before convincing them
of the justifications for the interview. Nevertheless, soon after arriving in the
studio, Mark Dodd, the head of BBC WS arrived in the studio. I don’t even
know who had informed him that I was doing this interview. He barred me
from interviewing and said we should not be artificially blowing the events out of
proportion.52
Khonji uses this as an example to reject the common belief that the BBC was
supporting the Islamic revolution in Iran. However, there is the possibility that Mark
Dodd’s assertion was made under pressure from the Iranian Embassy in London,
which by then was growing increasingly furious with the BBC broadcasts. He recalls
that after about three weeks, Mark Dodd did allow the interview with Khomeini but
Khonji was not the one to do it.
Some of the difficulty in arranging an interview with Khomeini was because
distrust of the BBC still persisted and Khomeini was not at all convinced that he
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should give the interview. Abulhassan Bani-Sadr, the contact who finally made the
interview possible, says that
I suggested to Khomeini to give an interview to the BBC, assuring him that they
will broadcast exactly what he says. Khomeini rejected saying ‘BBC belongs to the
British and it will not benefit us to give them an interview’. I convinced him when
I said all the other media you give interviews to are also all foreign so what is the
difference? Khomeini then accepted.53
The Shah himself accused the mass media of playing an important role during the last
three years that led to the revolution, arguing that ‘the competition of journalists
in search of ever more sensational news has led to the most regrettable excesses.’54
He singled out the BBC for particular comment:
No less surprising was the BBC’s attitude. From the beginning of 1978 their
Persian language broadcasts consisted of virulent attacks against my regime. It was
as though some mysterious conductor had given the go ahead to these attacks.
I am not mentioning the attitude of certain special envoys that caused certain
deplorable incidents to be magnified out of all proportion. I am tempted to say
that, for some newspapers a dead body is a godsend, and I think that some
newsagents must have made a fortune out of the events in Iran.55
The US Ambassador to Iran, William Sullivan, records in his book Mission to Iran, how
the Shah regularly used to complain about the BBC. Sullivan describes how in August
1978, just a few months before the revolution and during the time of martial law, the
Shah became especially suspicious and claimed that BBC broadcasts were formenting
opposition:
He [the Shah] pointed out the negotiations with the oil consortium were currently
underway and that this gave the British antagonists all the excuses they needed to
attempt the resumption of their ancient subversions in Iran. In listening to the
BBC broadcasts that were critical of his Government, he was, he said, confirmed
in this analysis.56
The Iranian Ambassador to the UK, Parviz Radji, describes the many meetings held in
the late 1970s between himself, the Managing Director of BBC External Services as
well as Ian Trethowan, the Director General of BBC, and Mark Dodd, Head of BBC’s
Eastern Service. It is evident that the Shah frequently cabled his anger at BBC Persian
Service reporting. Radji claims that he tried to tone down the anger and persuade
the Shah that it would not be appropriate to make direct complaints to the BBC,
explaining that this would make matters worse and give more credit to the BBC. His
recollection of a meeting on October 1977 reveals the kind of discussion that took
place between top BBC officials and the embassy:
Ian Trethowan, the new Director-General of the BBC comes to lunch bringing
with him Gerald Mansell, Robert Gregson and Mark Dodd . . . Mansell says if
a story gets taken up nationally he doesn’t see how the BBC can stay out of it.
530 H I S T O R I C A L J O U R N A L O F F I L M , R A D I O A N D T E L E V I S I O N
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Sr
eb
er
ny
, 
An
na
be
ll
e]
 A
t:
 1
6:
39
 2
0 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
08
Dodd says BBC needn’t stay out of it, but that if they should decide to give the
matter coverage, the views of the embassy should also be expressed. I say that’s all
I ask for. I then say that on my arrival in London, I had found three main problem
areas: the BBC, Amnesty International and the press.57
Radji tried to get Iranian officials to understand that there could be no Iranian
government pressure on the BBC, that the BBC acts independently, and even took
Iranian officials around the BBC to see how the newsroom operated and how the
Persian broadcasters translated the news. Radji’s account of one particular meeting
makes this point clearly:
The [Foreign Ministers] session breaks up and David Owen walks up to me
followed by Khalatbari, who raises the vexed subject of the BBC. He confesses to
be puzzled as to why ‘the BBC is more anxious to broadcast the views of the
opponents of your friends than the views of your friends.’ The Foreign Secretary
laughingly says, ‘I agree with everything you say, but there isn’t anything I can do
about it,’ again insisting on the BBC’s independence from the Foreign Office.58
But by November 1978, as the opposition crescendoed inside Iran, Radji himself made
a direct complaint, sending a letter of protest to the BBC that the Embassy is ‘frankly
astonished at the undisguised bias that is an ever-present feature of its broadcasts
and the compromising light in which they place the Government effort to restore
stability.’59 He describes other influential Iranians who also tried to put pressure on
the Persian Service, including Seyyed Hussein Nasr, the new head of the Empress’s
Private Bureau, who used his university contacts as well as the Iranian millionaire,
David Alliance, who used influential contacts in the business community in London
to pressure the BBC to tone down their Persian broadcasts.60
Radji’s explanation as to why Iranian officialdom expected more from the BBC
than other media organizations, reveals the dilemma that the BBCWS faces amongst
its listeners:
I say that what comes out of the BBC, or for that matter other foreign Persian
language broadcasts such as those of Radio Moscow, Radio South Yemen, or Radio
Iran courier . . . is nothing to decide the destiny of Iran. There is however, one
distinguishing factor about the BBC. While other Persian language transmissions
are honest in their desire to see the overthrow of the regime in Iran, the BBC,
which is quick to boast its independence and impartiality, remains the
broadcasting agency of a country that is a military ally of Iran. It is an agency
which is directly financed by the British Government, with the length of each
foreign language broadcast determined in consultation with the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office.61
As the popular movement in Iran gained momentum, the Shah’s anger with the BBC’s
detailed coverage of events increased. He particularly disliked the main BBC reporter,
Andrew Whitley. In December 1978, the BBC representative was summoned to
the Foreign Ministry ‘to explain his misrepresentation of facts’ in reporting the
money transfers being made out of Iran and that his expulsion seemed probable.62
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That did not actually happen. But the pressure put on the BBC by the Iranian Foreign
Minister, Amir Khosrow Afshar, increased. Radji writes of a meeting in December
1978:
At 11:30 Sir Michael Swann, Chairman of the BBC comes to [Amir Khosrow]
Afshar’s suite at Coleridge’s, and the next one and a half hours are devoted to
singling out for Sir Michael’s consideration instances, some genuine, others less
so, of BBC bias and particularly against the Iranian regime. Sir Michael, a soft
spoken, pipe-smoking person of academic appearance, is understandably
defensive.63
During the years that led to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the relationship between
the BBC Persian Service and millions of pro-revolutionary Iranians changed drastically.
The BBC Persian Service was now highly trusted and liked by ordinary people.
Gone were the days when the BBC Persian broadcasts were considered just for
intellectuals. The BBC had gained mass appeal and its image changed in the collective
perception of the population. It was no longer the voice of ‘British imperialism’ but
a trusted friend. At home and abroad, millions of Iranians were listening to the BBC
to find out the latest developments. It broadcast details of demonstrations, meetings
and opposition statements. It was the first channel from which that famous
demonstration slogan ‘death to the Shah’ was reported. A cartoon showed a man
walking into an electrical hardware shop to ‘buy a radio BBC’.
It is clear that considerable Iranian pressure was being put on the BBC Persian
Service to tone down its reporting on the events that led to the revolution. However,
despite the regular meetings with the Iranian Ambassador and despite attempts to
keep relations with Iranian officials amicable, there is no evidence of any attempt by
the BBC to appease the Shah or Iranian officials. BBC standards of journalistic
independence were always referred to as being the guide for all broadcasts. Even
a British official such as the Foreign Minister, David Owen, laughs away the notion
that he could have any influence over the BBC output.
In 2008–2009, major documents will be released under the 30 Year rule and
a fuller story can be written about the revolutionary period itself and its aftermath.
The BBC’s relationship with the Islamic Republic has been complex and not an easy
one. As of June 2008, access to BBC On-Line is filtered and the planned BBC Persian
television channel has not been given permission to run an office in Teheran.
The self-narrative of the BBCWS has altered over the past 75 years, to inhabit a
more overt role in ‘cultural diplomacy’ but perhaps maintaining more strongly than
ever the line of editorial and managerial distance from government.
This article has explored three moments in the evolution of the current position
of ‘editorial and managerial independence’, as this pertains to the history of one
specific country and one language service. The dynamics have evolved from overt
government direction to more arms-length framing to a laughing recognition by
a senior minister of the difficulty of influencing broadcast output, and yet the
perception by the current Iranian regime of government–broadcaster collusion is
perhaps stronger than ever. The precise mechanisms of influence of the earlier periods
are traceable through government and broadcaster archives, the historic documents
532 H I S T O R I C A L J O U R N A L O F F I L M , R A D I O A N D T E L E V I S I O N
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Sr
eb
er
ny
, 
An
na
be
ll
e]
 A
t:
 1
6:
39
 2
0 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
08
clearly revealing the relationships between the Embassy in Teheran, the ministries and
the BBCWS management. The more recent period remains allusive to pin down,
especially since employees all disavow even any attempts at influence and much of the
formal paperwork is not yet released. That the story has changed over time is clear
but so too is the fact that this story is not over; not at all.
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